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At European level the implementation of both the Bologna process and of the Lisbon
Strategy have been promoting the development of policy implementation tools. In this paper,
we discuss the tools of policy implementation and how they contribute to changing the
European higher education systems towards the establishment of a European Higher
Education Area (EHEA), a goal of the Bologna process. Empirical data is used to assess
how far the use of soft law mechanisms has been effective for the implementation of the
Bologna process at institutional level, including its coordination capacity.
Keywords: Bologna process, European Higher Education Area, European policy of regu-
lation/coordination
1. Introduction
In the Community method of governance of the EU that implies passing European legisla-
tion (Amaral & Veiga, 2012), the European Commission (EC) has the monopoly for initiating
legislative procedures and plays a major role in taking member states to court for failing to
implement decisions. The Council of Ministers decides in most cases by qualified majority
voting, the European Parliament plays an active role and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
ensures the uniform interpretation of Community Law (Wallace, 2000). In the Community met-
hod, there is delegation of power from the nation states to the EC, which may result in what
is known as «agency loss» in the literature on delegation (Schäfer, 2004).
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Schäfer recognises that «the Community Method delegates considerable power to the
Commission and the ECJ and offers ample opportunity to act independently of their princi-
pals» (ibidem: 3). Consequently, being difficult for the principal to control the activities of the
agent (Pollack, 1997), over the years the EC, with the support of the European Court of
Justice, has been able to increase considerably its competencies and area of influence.
In the early 1990s, national governments decided to oppose further expansion of the
European Commission competencies that was apparently opening the way to what seemed to
be an unlimited erosion of the sovereignty of the nation state (Dehousse, 2002: 2). This reac-
tion brought about the revival of the subsidiarity principle in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty with
the famous «double negative» formulation of the principle in article 3b of the Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, only and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community. (European Union, 1992: 6)
When the Lisbon strategy was adopted (European Council, 2000), it was recognised that
policies in areas protected by the subsidiarity principle needed to be coordinated at European
level although the Community method could no longer be used because member states were
not willing to delegate further powers to the EC. As policy-making tool, the Portuguese
government proposed to retrieve the procedures already implemented and applied with the
Employment Strategy – European guidelines, national action plans, peer review and naming
and shaming – that were presented as a quasi-novelty under the name of «open method of
coordination» (OCM). This tool involves:
• fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the
goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
• establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks
against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and
sectors as a means of comparing best practice;
• translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific
targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and regional differences;
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning proces-
ses. (European Council, 2000: §37)
OMC avoids transferring power to the EC, thus avoiding agency loss. As member states
remain in control of politics, they are not confronted with the principal-agent problem
(Schäfer, 2004) while the nonbinding character of soft law protects them from undesirable
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consequences. And when deciding to implement unsavoury policies, they can always use
Brussels as a scapegoat.
These EU policy-making dynamics impact the implementation of education policies at
various levels of analysis. The next section reviews soft law instruments and coordination pro-
blems. The section that follows analyses the impact of EU policy implementation at institutio-
nal level in the case of the Bologna process. The paper concludes with a discussion of preli-
minary research findings on the implementation of the Bologna process in seven HEIs located
in four higher education systems – Germany, Italy, Norway, and Portugal.
2. Education policies at national level: soft law and coordination problems
We have seen that the EU is increasingly using «soft law» instruments in matters of national
political sensitivity, allowing member states to avoid additional delegation of power to the EU.
Although the OMC has allowed the European Union to have some influence on areas that
have been considered the preserve of member states (Dehousse, 2002: 6), the EU pays the
price of being too weak to guarantee efficient policy coordination (ibidem: 15). In an area of
national political sensitivity, the EU does not have the power to pass European legislation
required for policy implementation, which depends on legislation produced by each member
state, in line with the national context.
The OMC is used in areas of national political sensitivity where, unlike the case of econo-
mic policy, convergence is not imperative (ibidem: 10). Some authors argue that «the central
aim of coordination is to encourage national reforms, convergence being seen as a side-effect
rather than as an end in itself» (Biagi, 2000: 159), or «most coordination processes are aimed at
initiating or facilitating reforms to be conducted at the national level» (Dehousse, 2002: 10).
And Hemerijck considers that «the objective is not to achieve common policies, but rather to
share policy experiences and practices» (2002: 40). Therefore, it may well happen that, «as
harmonisation is not the goal and legislation is not the method, the effectiveness of open
coordination could be frustrated» (Idema, 2004: 192).
The OMC aims at allowing each state to take steps to protect «national differences while
accepting commonly agreed guidelines and taking inspiration from “best practices” abroad»
(Hemerijck, 2002: 40). OMC leaves policy implementation completely in the hands of national
governments while the Commission is charged with assessing the policies and progress of the
member states (European Commission, 2005). OMC complies with the principle of subsidia-
rity, respecting national contexts. It pleases politicians as it offers them the possibility to «shift
blame for unpopular decisions to the EU» (Mosher, 2000: 7) or «as a source of legitimation and
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blame-sharing in order to advance their own domestic agenda» (Zeitlin, 2005a: 451) and «focu-
ses on processes instead of outcomes (thereby leaving future possible negative outcomes to
future governments)» (Kröger, 2004: 6).
The fact that no formal sanctions are foreseen (Radaelli, 2003; Trubek & Trubek, 2005), as
well as the use of what is in general a broader rather than detailed definition of objectives, lea-
ves ample room for interpretation and implementation in the member states (Kröger, 2004).
Musselin argues that this allows member states to use «more offensive forms of re-nationalisation,
by which governmental actors re-nationalise the process, not so much by taking control over the
European measures but by using them to tackle domestic objectives or problems» (2009: 185).
The OMC’s difficulties in ensuring effective coordination are also the result of the low
degree of accuracy of «naming and shaming» mechanisms that are based on analysis of natio-
nal action plans and national reports, both of them produced by national governments. As
argued by Zeitlin (2005b: 17), governments use OMC as «an exercise in symbolic politics
where national governments repackage existing policies to demonstrate their apparent com-
pliance with EU objectives».
However, despite its apparent weakness, the OMC is capable of producing results and
promote changes. «Open coordination can contribute to a disciplined policy cycle because it
creates an external expectation of periodic target setting and evaluation in the form of action
plans» (Idema, 2004: 188), while «a more subtle or creeping way of stimulation can result from
common language-use through the European interactions» (ibidem: 190). Zeitlin argues there
is enough evidence, at least in some areas, to illustrate substantive political change that contri-
buted not only to «broad shifts in national policy thinking», but also «to specific changes in
individual Member States’ policies» (Zeitlin, 2005b: 20).
In principle, the OMC was supposed to stimulate the bottom-up input of stakeholders
through civil society, stimulating domestic learning and reinforcing its democratic legitimacy
by fostering the participation of local actors, regional governments, social actors, and parlia-
ments (Idema, 2004). Unfortunately, the OMC has not so far produced results in this area, as
neither parliaments nor civil society are involved in the discussion and evaluation of National
Action Plans (NAPs), and only a very limited number of local and national policy makers are
involved in peer reviews (ibidem).
It is interesting to compare the OECD policy implementation methods with those of the
EU open method of coordination. Hemerijck and Visser (2003) compared the OECD’s Job
Study and the European Union’s Employment Strategy (EES), both aiming at improving the
poor employment performance of member states in the late 1990s. They found that they
embody quite different mimicking strategies, conditions and procedures, with varying conse-
quences for domestic learning and reform (2003: 29). The OECD hires country specialists to
124
prepare and examine their own data on policies, outputs, and outcomes, and the report can
be finished almost entirely «without the co-operation of member states, though publication is
occasionally preceded by tough negotiations with national officials» (ibidem: 38-39). The EES
relies on cooperation from member states, even for data collection (the National Action Plans)
and the organisation of peer review (ibidem). Therefore, the OECD reports may induce «the
perception that undertaking reform involves conflict with policy objectives concerning equity
and social cohesion» (Elmeskov, 1998). «[The EES] is therefore more contextualised by domes-
tic concerns. While the OECD’s learning from others tells how it should be, learning with
others in the EES tells what is feasible» (Hemerijck & Visser, 2003: 39).
We will now examine the implementation of the Bologna process for understanding how
national higher education policies relate to EU level policies. A number of authors (Musselin,
2009; Gornitzka, 2007; Krücken, 2005; Witte, 2006) recognise that the implementation of
Bologna entails what Musselin designates re-nationalisation processes, as national authorities
use Bologna to achieve other objectives. And Musselin adds:
Similar to many other European, international or global processes, the Bologna reform is confronted with spe-
cific institutional contexts in the country where it is implemented. There is therefore no automatic and similar
declination of this reform in each country: when the same measures are «applied» on different national set-
tings, the latter incorporate the European measures and transform them into a specific national mixture (…) 
The local adaptations, national translations and side effects attached to each domestic implementation weaken
the convergence potential of Bologna. (2009: 186, 198)
A recent progress report entitled The Bologna Process Independent Assessment (European
Commission, 2010) was presented at the 2010 Bologna Ministerial Anniversary Conference,
held at Budapest and Vienna. This report concludes that in general all countries have passed
legislation to introduce and regulate elements of the Bologna process and most «architectural»
elements of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) have been implemented (European
Commission, 2010). However, not only have countries implemented Bologna at considerably
different speeds – some have shown considerable progress across all the action lines while
others have still to start on some of them –, they also used different interpretations of Bologna
to answer different national contexts. 
There are explanations for the lack of convergence of the OMC type processes. Not only
sanctions are not foreseen for laggards, but also the «naming and shaming» instruments are
rather crude as they are based on national action plans and national reports prepared by the
relevant ministries. And ministries will obviously try to avoid presenting too negative accounts
of their own activity. It has been argued that open coordination «allows for window dressing:
the process by which open coordination remains an administrative formality of dressing-up
existing policy» (Idema, 2004: 192).
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In the case of the Bologna process, «naming and shaming» is based on the stocktaking
reports. The successive biannual scorecards present an increasingly green picture (very good
and excellent performances), reminding us of an Irish landscape, with lots of green almost
everywhere, only a few scattered reds (little progress) to be seen. Colours are based on natio-
nal reports that in many cases are more of a marketing exercise than a critical analysis of pro-
gress (see Veiga & Amaral, 2009 for a more detailed analysis). Indeed, many national reports
carefully avoid presenting a critical picture of national implementation progress thus making
difficult any eventual shaming, a task made even more difficult by the frequent use of «weasel
words» (Amaral & Neave, 2009) and the «general texts of presidency conclusions and rather
open targets» (Idema & Kelemen, 2009: 113).
The 2005 stocktaking report (Bologna Follow-up Group, 2005) concluded that very good
progress had been made on achieving the targets in the three priority action lines set by the
Conference of Ministers in the Berlin Communiqué (2003): quality assurance, degree system,
and recognition. However, the report also identified a number of important gaps in those
areas. In 2005, 43 countries participated in the first stocktaking exercise, 28 of which were
given «green or light green» and no one was given the red colour for the item «Quality assu-
rance»; there were 31 «green or light green» countries and only two red ones for the item «The
two cycle degree system», 34 «green or light green» countries and no red one for the item
«Recognition of degrees and periods of study».
The 2007 report (Bologna Follow-up Group, 2007) presented an even greener picture. The
main conclusions were that there had been good progress in the Bologna process since
Bergen, the outlook for achieving the goals of Bologna by 2010 was good, although there
were still some challenges to be faced. The report concluded that stocktaking worked 
well as an integral part of the Bologna process strategy. Out of the total 48 countries participa-
ting in the exercise, there were 34 «green and light green» countries and no red one on the
item «Stage of implementation of the first and second cycle», 42 «green and light green coun-
tries» and only three red ones on the item «Access to the next cycle» and 13 «green and light green
countries» and only one red on the item «Implementation of national qualification frameworks».
The 2007 Trends report (EUA, 2007) used for the first time both quantitative and qualitative
research with substantial effort being dedicated to the local level where implementation was
now taking place. The report was substantially more critical than previous reports in the series
and raised several implementation problems. Its conclusions were far more critical than the very
green picture presented by the scorecard seemed to indicate. This raised questions about the
adequacy of the indicators being used. It was therefore without surprise that the 2009 score-
cards (Bologna Follow-up Group, 2009) suddenly lost some of its green colour, with a lot more
of red to be seen. The report explained this was the result of using more demanding indicators:
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Whereas in 2005 it was sufficient to show that work had been started, and for the 2007 stocktaking it was
often enough that some work towards achieving the goals could be demonstrated or that legislation was in
place, in 2009 the criteria for the indicators were substantially more demanding.
(…) The overall picture for the whole EHEA is not as «green» in 2009 as it was in the two previous stocktaking
reports in 2005 and 2007. (Bologna Follow-up Group, 2009: 6)
The 2009 report (ibidem) included again 48 countries. There were 41 «green and light
green» countries and one red on the item «Stage of implementation of the first and second
cycle«; 44 «green and light green countries» and no red ones on the item «Access to the next
cycle», and 12 «green and light green countries» and nine red ones on the item
«Implementation of national qualification frameworks». However, while announcing that there
had been further progress in the Bologna process since London, the report also acknowled-
ged that not all the goals of the Bologna process would be achieved by 2010. 
It is also interesting to compare the results of the Bologna stocktaking exercise that classi-
fies the performance of countries by awarding colours with those of the Lisbon scorecard that
classifies countries as «heroes» and «villains». Just to give an example, in the 2009 Lisbon stock-
taking report, Portugal was awarded green or light green on every item, which means that
apparently the country was doing very well in the implementation of higher education poli-
cies. However, the Lisbon scorecards branded Portugal as villain in the items «Bringing people
into the workforce» (rigid labour markets and underperforming education systems) and
«Upgrading skills» (fewer than 20% of young people graduate with an university degree). This
demonstrates that there is also some inconsistency in the use of indicators for the same area
(education) in different contexts.
All this sheds some light on the Bologna implementation strategy. On the one hand, the
objectives of Bologna have increased in quantity and refinement, and some even argued this
was aimed at keeping the impression of progress, of successful implementation (like riding a
bicycle, if you stop, you fall). On the other hand, the Bologna process lived off the notion of
successful progress towards its final objectives, without reflection on inconsistencies or unin-
tended effects its progress might produce. Reports were in general uncritical, presenting
results in a triumphal mode, while implementation difficulties at local level were ignored as
they might distract from the ultimate objective of shaping the EHEA, whatever this shape
might be. However, as stocktaking proved incapable of producing efficient implementation
and when other instruments questioned its optimistic conclusions, its indicators were made
progressively more demanding, trying to eliminate inconsistencies between policy goals and
practices at national and institutional levels.
Therefore, it remains to be seen if the coordination difficulties of soft law policies can deal
with the apparent large diversity of national implementation policies to create a coherent
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policy framework in the long term and the convergence of the Bologna process. For Musselin,
this will not be possible «unless the same aspects are addressed in the same way in each
country, but there is poor evidence of that» (2009: 198).
3. Soft law and embedding at institutional level
The implementation of Bologna offers a fascinating opportunity to examine multi-level
governance processes as its final implementation depends on the workings of autonomous
institutions, the universities. And «domestic institutions play a key role in absorbing, rejecting,
or domesticating Europe» (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2004: 9). This raises the question of determining
how far soft law processes can be embedded or mainstreamed within domestic institutional
contexts (Armstrong, 2003 as cited in Idema, 2004: 181). And Neave argues «the test of
“embeddedness” does not lie at the systems level, rather at the institutional level» (Neave,
2004).
Our analysis of the institutional level is based on data collected using a questionnaire han-
ded out in 2008 to academic staff, students and administrative and management staff from
seven comprehensive European universities (Veiga, 2010). The seven higher education institu-
tions that accepted to participate in the survey are located in Germany, Italy, Norway, and
Portugal. The contribution of each university was 30 academics and 60 students, per scientific
area, and 20 administrative and management staff. These numbers give a well-balanced repre-
sentation of the constituencies of universities in the selected scientific areas: law, history,
medicine, and physics.
Respondents were asked to rate each statement according to a four-point rating ordinal
scale to force an option (from «disagree» to «agree», from «no change» to «large change», from
«no impact» to «major impact», from «not implemented» to «fully implemented», and from «no
activity» to «high activity», depending on the specific question). Respondents could also
declare «no opinion» if issues were recognizable but they had no opinion, and could state «do
not know» if issues were totally unfamiliar.
The questionnaire included three distinct parts:
a) the Bologna process as a policy process 
b) the views on the implementation of the Bologna process in the university
c) the views on changes in the teaching/learning and research processes.
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In total, 947 respondents replied to the questionnaire, which corresponds to a response
rate of 35%.
The aim of the questionnaire’s first section was to perceive how the constituencies of uni-
versities were aware of Bologna as a policy process. They were asked questions about dimen-
sions related to Bologna’s drivers, objectives, focuses, and changes, taking the perspective of
each national higher education system. The second part of the questionnaire aimed at unders-
tanding how the different constituencies assessed the implementation of Bologna in their own
university. The third and last part of the questionnaire focused on changes in the teaching,
learning, and research processes as perceived by the academic staff. The aim of this section
was to understand how academics assessed changes in teaching and learning processes resul-
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By institution 2695 947 >35%
A-PT 385 304 ±79%
B-PT 385 267 >69%
C-IT 385 113 >29%
D-IT 385 82 >21%
E-GE 385 63 >16%
F-NO 385 88 ±23%
G-NO 385 30 ±8%
By disciplinary field 2520 872 >34%
Law 630 231 ±37%
Physics 630 226 ±36%
History 630 212 ±34%
Medicine 630 203 ±32%
By the three Estates 2695 947 >35%
Academic staff 840 321 >38%
Student 1680 551 ±33%
Admin. & manag. staff1 175 75 ±43%
PT: Portugal; IT: Italy; GE: Germany; NO: Norway
Sample Number of responses Response rate
TABLE 1
Breakdown of the answers
1 Administrative and management staff included staff in Academic affairs units, Quality units, International offices,
Informatics and information systems units placed in central administration and at middle management level (e.g.,
faculty/school or departmental level).
ting from the implementation of Bologna. In this paper we present the research findings rela-
ted to aspects that are important for the governance of the Bologna process. 
Academics are centrally positioned in higher education institutions and they read changes
and adapt to sustain their positions (Becher & Trowler, 2001: 164), which emphasises the pro-
cess of local interpretation that conditions change. In this process, academics try to ensure
they will not lose privileges or their professional prerogatives (Martin, 1999). Therefore, aca-
demics are not passive, rather they can be actively involved in using coping strategies, even
voicing discontent with the status quo, or leading policy reconstruction aimed at reinterpre-
ting and reforming policies interfering with their institutional life (Trowler, 1998). Henkel
(2000) refers to collective resistance in the form of deliberate distortion of policy requirements
(e.g., into compliant paper-chasing) or even of «wilful misunderstanding», while Kogan (1999)
speaks of the opportunities created by «constructive ambiguity».
Students as clients or consumers are placed in a peripheral, volatile, and ephemeral position
regarding higher education. In the Portuguese context, studies about the involvement of students
in evaluation processes (Cardoso, 2009) indicate they were not involved in decision-making and
evaluation processes because, among other reasons, the academic staff and the administrative
and management staff were seen as more representative of academic authority and management,
respectively. Consequently, students are not very motivated to get involved in processes and ins-
titutional dynamics within higher education institutions (ibidem). This position contrasts with the
role of (some) students acting as consultative members of the Bologna process in representation
of the European Students’ Union (ESU). However this role does not provide evidence, it creates a
stimulus to their active participation in university structures. Students do not sustain convincingly
their intellectual interests and it is difficult to grasp their perception about the university (Clark,
1983). Then, students are often (in)voluntary excluded from institutional dynamics.
The administrative and management staff originally tended to be in the periphery of higher
education institutions, but, as they created and spread routines and procedures related to their
professional activity, they moved to the centre (ibidem). With the rise of New Public
Management, the administrative staff see themselves as essential professional contributors to
the successful functioning of the contemporary university and consider that the present com-
plexity of their job is no longer compatible with the amateur approach of «a senior professor of
patriarchal structure (…) with the role assumed by people who were good at that sort of thing
and also had established academic reputations» (interviewee quoted in Henkel, 2000: 236). 
The first part of the questionnaire enquired respondents about the implementation process
at system level. The very high percentage of «no opinion» and «do not know» answers about
perceptions on Bologna as a policy process (motivations, goals, targets, focuses, and changes)
is probably the most disturbing result as it shows a very low level of awareness about the
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Bologna process. Questions about rationales (political rationales), strategic objectives (e.g.,
establishment of EHEA), targets (administrative reform), focus of the reforms (removal of bar-
riers to facilitate the mobility of citizens), and policies (mobility of European students and
staff) collected a very high percentage of suspended opinion (see Figure 1). As these subdi-
mensions are at the core of the Bologna process, the results show a very low level of embed-
ding of the political process by the «pays réel», to use Neave’s terminology (Neave, 2004).
Furthermore, the low awareness about Bologna as a policy process may be understood by
factors affecting the implementation process as identified in the literature (Cerych & Sabatier,
1986). The analysis of rationales and strategic objectives as perceived by the pays réel
demonstrates lack of consistency and clarity, which does not facilitate policy implementation.
This undermines the degree of institutional commitment to the various objectives linked to
the EHEA, such as increasing mobility, employability, competitiveness, and attractiveness.
The objectives of Bologna, as in most policies, are multiple, conflicting, and vague (ibidem)
and they have been progressively changed as successive ministerial conferences added more and
more additional objectives to give an impression of dynamism. A good example of shifting goals
leading to lack of clarity of political purposes is the analysis of mobility that lies at the very heart
of the Bologna process and was reflected in the vagueness of answers to questions related to
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FIGURE 1
Bologna motivations, goals, targets, focuses and changes
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
A B C D E
No opinion Do not know
A – Motivations of the Bologna process – In your HE system the implementation of Bologna is strongly motivated by political considerations
B – Strategic goals of the Bologna reforms – In your HE system recent reforms are being implemented to establish the EHEA
C – The targets of Bologna reforms – In your HE system the implementation of Bologna is an administrative reform (degree structure, ECTS, etc.)
D – The focus of Bologna reforms – In your HE system the implementation of Bologna is focused on removal of barriers to facilitate mobility
E – Changes resulting from the implementation of Bologna – In your HE system the implementation of Bologna has changed the mobility of
European students and staff
changes in mobility as result of implementing the Bologna process. This may be the result of a
shift of the fundamental nature of mobility activities within the EHEA. The traditional concept of
mobility as established by European programmes such as Erasmus and Socrates, which have pro-
moted the mobility of European students for a period of studies, is being replaced with the
notion of the attractiveness of higher education systems for students from other continents and
regions. The new objectives are related to competitiveness and attractiveness of the EHEA where
economic rationales, the development of competitive European HE market, and internationalisa-
tion are interlinked. It is also interesting to note that the rated answers provided a wide range of
contradictory views between groups of respondents. Few elements were consensual, suggesting
dispute of arguments and different perceptions about external pressures.
The second part of the questionnaire aimed at understanding how the university consti-
tuencies assessed the implementation of Bologna in their own university. The first section
(Figure 2) analysed the impacts of European and national initiatives, the European dimension,
and changes in the university.
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FIGURE 2
Impact of European and national initiatives, European dimension, and changes in the individual university
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
A B C D
No opinion Do not know
A – Impact of European initiatives – What is the influence of Trends reports by the European University Association on the implementation of Bologna?
B – Impact of national initiatives – What is the impact of the legal framework on the implementation of Bologna?
C – The European dimension of the Bologna process – Does the convergence of the degree structure reflect the European dimension in your university?
D – Changes in the university resulting from the implementation of Bologna – Did the implementation of Bologna change the benchmarking activi-
ties in your university?
The percentages of «no opinion» and «do not know» continued to be rather high, but not
so high as for the first part of the questionnaire (Figure 1). This might be explained by impli-
cations that the implementation of the policy decisions have for the grassroots of higher edu-
cation institutions, i.e., they are more aware of the implementation problems at their own ins-
titution than at system level. However, the level of «no opinion» and «do not know» in some
areas was still disturbing. This was the case about the perceived impact of international
reports, the legal framework, the convergence of the degree structure with other European
degree structures, and benchmarking activities.
The second section analysed the awareness about the degree of implementation of diffe-
rent dimensions of the Bologna process (degree structure, pedagogic reform, diploma supple-
ment, credit system, and quality assurance mechanisms). Some results reveal substantial con-
tradictions in the answers given by respondents. For example, 56% of the respondents percei-
ved the level of implementation of pedagogic reform as fully implemented or moderately
implemented. However, this percentage was only 30% for the implementation of the Diploma
Supplement and 35% for the implementation of the ECTS. This is mainly the result of the con-
tribution of the answers from the academic staff that did not give much relevance to the
Diploma Supplement and the credit system. 
The survey also enquired about the level of fulfilment of the objectives set for the degree
structure, the Diploma Supplement and the credit system, and the objectives of internal
mechanisms for quality assurance and its degree of implementation (Table 2).
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Awareness of the implementation 
of Bologna
Impact of the Bologna degree 
structure
Impact of the Diploma 
Supplement
Impact of the credit system
Quality assurance
Internal quality systems
Pedagogic reform
(38% fully implemented)
Increase mobility of students
(38% major impact)
Increase mobility of students 
and graduates (26% major impact)
Improvement of the comparability of
European higher education systems
(35% major impact)
To progress on accreditation
(27% agree)
Assessment of teaching quality
(33% fully implemented)
Credit system
(43% No opinion)
Increase mobility of students
(18% No opinion)
Enhanced the attractiveness of European
higher education systems to foreigners
(32% Do not know)
Improvement of the comparability of
European higher education systems
(18% No opinion)
To enhance European dimension
(26% No opinion)
Assessment of research quality
(23% Do not know)
Dimension Expression of a rated opinion Opinion suspended
TABLE 2
Awareness of the implementation and impact of some dimensions of the Bologna process
The perceived impacts of the Bologna degree structure on mobility and of the credit sys-
tem on comparability address two objectives of the EHEA, mobility and comparability; howe-
ver, research findings also reveals incongruities. The rise of student mobility noted as a major
impact of both the implementation of the degree structure and the Diploma Supplement also
received the highest level of opinion suspended. The views about the full implementation of
the pedagogic reform clash with the lack of awareness about the implementation of the credit
system. The impact of the credit system on comparability is viewed with scepticism.
Awareness about transformation, changes, and impacts addresses the impact of European
programmes, the changes in internationalisation and quality policy areas and in recognition
procedures of European and foreign degrees; the setting up of support structures aiming to
improve information/communication systems; the recognition of large changes in pedagogies;
the major impact of competencies definition and learning objectives in the Bologna degree
structure.
Interesting results were the perception of negative impacts related to increased control by
central administration and the lowering of the level of job satisfaction resulting among other
aspects from increased bureaucracy and less time available for research. 
The analysis of the level of awareness about the implementation of Bologna identified at
least two issues lost in translation in the trajectory of policy implementation – increasing
employability and relevance of lifelong learning. Answers on the perceived impacts of the
Bologna degree structure placed employability after everything else. The differentiation of
profile of qualifications was not perceived with great interest and the development of students’
professional competencies obtained the highest share of partially disagreeing answers. And alt-
hough respondents recognized changes in lifelong learning resulting from the implementation
of Bologna, its connection with the credit system was not established clearly. 
The last part of the questionnaire was reserved to the academic staff and enquired about
changes in the teaching, learning, and research processes as perceived by them. It is interesting
to notice that the percentage of «no opinion» and «do not know» answers decreased substan-
tially when compared with the initial parts of the questionnaire. However, the perceived rele-
vance of both the Diploma Supplement and the credit system by academics remains surprising.
The worth of Diploma Supplement to improve the information given to stakeholders lacks
awareness since 38% of academics «do not know» about that potential. The perceived relevance
of the credit system was also unexpected as the component that gathered higher agreement
(fostering the adoption of the ECTS grading system) also received more «no opinion». 
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4. Conclusions
We can present some conclusions. The first conclusion is that the implementation of hig-
her education policies using soft law is successful in promoting change, but has difficulties in
effective coordination. The absence of sanctions and the lack of clarity and consistency of
policies, together with re-nationalisation processes, contribute to convergence difficulties.
The second conclusion is that the «naming and shaming» mechanisms of Bologna were
designed to spread the gospel by giving a permanent impression of successful advance
towards the intended objectives, which has not made them suitable for putting effective pres-
sure over the national governments to ensure a reasonable level of convergence. And, even if
there was a real intention of using effective shaming mechanisms, it is debatable how far this
effectiveness could be achieved (Idema & Kelemen, 2006).
The third conclusion is that there is still a low level of embeddedness of the Bologna pro-
cess at institutional level, as demonstrated by the high level of «no opinion» and «do not
know» answers given by respondents to questions that are at the core of the Bologna process.
The level of suspended opinion increased when questions addressed levels more removed
from the daily life of institutions, such as those related to the European level or the system,
and decreased when they entered the realm of the core activities of universities.
The dimensions covered in the survey also elicited a wide range of contradictory views
between groups of respondents. Few elements were consensual (e.g., cultural rationales,
reduction of public expenditure, governance reform, perceived impact of Bologna degree
structure, etc.) suggesting dispute of arguments and different perceptions about external pres-
sures depending on the university, the Estate and the discipline.
At last, our findings confirm the marginal role of students, who in general were responsi-
ble for the highest percentage of suspended opinion. They were the least involved in the
implementation process, which might be explained by the criteria used to select the students
that did not privilege the choice of unionised students.
Recent developments around the future of the Bologna process are also interesting.
Apparently there is no intention to assess the real degree of embeddedness of the Bologna
process by researching how far its objectives were fulfilled before deciding to move on.
Questions such as «Are most students entering the labour market after completing the first
cycle?», «Is the second cycle becoming an instrument of lifelong learning instead of a compo-
nent of the initial training?», «Do employers see the first cycle as granting employability?», «Did
Bologna increase student and graduate mobility?», and «Is the European higher education area
efficient in attracting students from outside Europe?» have remained largely unanswered,
except for a number of «soft» reports paid by the Commission. The only independent report
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was made by the European Students Union (ESU, 2009), which concludes there is a «distinctly
“déjà vu” feeling that strongly reflects a lack of progress with many aspects of the Process»
while implementation remained «an “à la carte” menu that member countries were using to
hand-pick the reforms and action lines they wanted to work on, and turning a blind eye to
the rest» (ibidem: 7), thus confirming the coordination difficulties of the OMC.
The Draft motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the role of the European institu-
tions to the consolidation and progress of the Bologna process (European Parliament, 2011) is
supported on a report (appended in the same Draft motion as Explanatory Statement) written
by Enrico Berlinguer, the Italian Minister of Education who signed the Sorbonne declaration and
organised the Bologna meeting. Berlinguer’s report recognises there are still a number of imple-
mentation problems and bottlenecks that were not unravelled until the 2010 deadline. What is
interesting is the fact that the draft motion 
points out that the Bologna Process 2012 Biannual Ministerial Meeting in Bucharest must take into account
that the creation of EHEA has determined the conditions for a joint competence of the EU and the Member
States on the issue of higher education. (European Parliament, 2011, emphasis added)
Thus the possible consequence of the political recognition of the frailties of the OMC to
ensure coordination is apparently leading to further creeping competence of the Commission,
an opportunity this agent will not ignore.
Contact: CIPES – Centro de Investigação de Políticas do Ensino Superior, Rua Primeiro de Dezembro, 399,
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